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Growth, Welfare, and Public Infrastructure:  






Empirical studies have found infrastructure investment important for a country’s economic 
performance, but have not provided clear guidelines for infrastructure policy or its effects on other 
macroeconomic variables. This paper develops a general equilibrium model of a small open 
economy to study the effects of public infrastructure on output, private investment and welfare. The 
model is parameterized and solved for three Latin American countries: Brazil, Mexico, and Peru. 
Results show that infrastructure can have positive effects on output, private investment and welfare. 
However, raising public infrastructure investment past a certain threshold can be detrimental. All 
three countries are shown to have under-invested in infrastructure in the 1970s and 1980s. The 






Most economists agree that a country’s public infrastructure is one of the pillars of 
economic growth. Publicly provided airports, highways, streets, and water systems contribute 
to output growth because they can increase productivity of private factors and decrease costs. 
Empirical studies of developing countries and cross-country regressions have found 
infrastructure important for a country’s growth (e.g., Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Ford and 
Poret (1991), Canning and Fay (1993), among others). Papers in this literature have typically 
used regression analysis on either “growth accounting” or steady state equations. While these 
papers have been useful in pointing out the importance of infrastructure, their methodology 
does not allow for analyzing important general equilibrium feedback effects among variables 
or for out-of-sample policy experiments. 
This paper develops a general equilibrium framework that yields quantitative 
predictions that can be used for policy analysis. In addition to studying t he overall 
productiveness of infrastructure, this paper studies its effects on other macroeconomic 
variables such as private investment and welfare.  Some of the questions addressed are: is 
private business investment encouraged or deterred with additional public investment, and in 
what proportion? How does additional infrastructure investment affect the population’s 
welfare? Most previous studies of infrastructure have only focused on the implications for 
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output.
1 This paper tries to offer infrastructure policy recommendations that are computed 
based on the largest welfare gains to the population. 
In order to address these issues, a two-sector general equilibrium model of a small open 
economy is constructed. The model provides an internally consistent framework for policy 
analysis as suggested by Lucas (1987). The model is grounded in the equilibrium theoretical 
literature of Uzawa (1974), Barro (1990), and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994). However, their 
models are not quantitatively solved and do not emphasize welfare and private investment 
effects.  
The model is parameterized to three Latin American countries: Brazil, Mexico, and Peru. 
Results show that infrastructure can have positive effects on output, private investment and 
welfare. However, raising public infrastructure investment past a certain threshold can be 
detrimental. All three countries are shown to have under-invested in infrastructure in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The gains from optimal infrastructure policy are greatest for Peru, the country with 
lowest infrastructure expenditure. The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the 
model. Section III describes the solution procedure and intuition. The quantitative evaluation 
of the model and policy implications are analyzed in Section IV, while Section V offers 
concluding remarks. 
 
II. The Model 
 
There are many households inhabiting the small open economy. Households have three 
sources of income. First, they earn wages by supplying their effort to firms. Second, they earn 
a return on physical capital that they own by renting it to firms. Third, they earn a return on 
their net holdings of foreign bonds, which they can buy and sell at the world interest rate. 
Households are utility maximizers, so they decide on their levels of consumption, investment, 
and foreign bond holdings. They also decide on their work effort and on how much capital to 
rent to firms in the economy. In the production sector, there is a representative firm that 
produces a final good using private capital and labor. In addition, there ex ists an external input 
in production, public infrastructure, which is provided by the government. The government 
finances infrastructure investment by taxing output at a flat rate, and it has to balance its 
budget constraint every period. A two-sector neoclassical general equilibrium model of a 




A large number of identical infinitely lived households, a representative firm, and a 
government populate the economy. Households have preferences over  consumption and 
leisure streams 
¥
=0 } , { t t t l c  given by the utility function  
 
 
1. Among the exceptions are Looney and Frederiken (1997) and Blejer and Khan (1984) who study private investment 
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t l c U b ,                                                                                                                   (1) 
where the discount factor is 0< b <1.  ) (￿ U  is an instantaneous felicity function that is  
assumed to display standard properties. The amount of labor supplied by the household is  t n , 
and the total amount of time available to a person is normalized to unity so that  . 1 £ + t t n l  The 
household’s budget constraint can be written as, 
 
. 1 t t t t t t t t t b k R n w b p i c + + £ + + +                                                                                       (2) 
 
This budget constraint has a standard “uses cannot exceed sources” accounting interpretation. 
The left-hand side describes the uses of funds. Households can spend on consumption  ) ( t c , 
investment  ) ( t i (they own capital), or purchase foreign bonds that come due next period  ) ( 1 + t b  
at price pt. Thus pt denotes the price of a bond that delivers one unit of consumption next 
period. The sources side of Equation (2) describes how the household earns income. The 
household  rents capital  ) ( t k  to the firm earning a net return of  t R . The household also earns 
a wage rate of  t w  for its work effort, nt , and has net holdings of foreign bonds,  t b , purchased 
last period which come due at time t. Since this is a small open economy,  t R  is also the world 
interest rate. This is a standard assumption in small open economy models as these economies 
are too small to affect the world interest rate, but can borrow and lend internationally at that 
rate. This effectively ties their domestic interest rate to the world’s rate. 
Private capital evolves according to,  
 
( ) , 1 1 t K t t k i k d - + = +  
 
where  K d  is the depreciation rate of capital. The private capital stock tomorrow  ) ( 1 + t k  is equal 
to the amount invested today  ) ( t i  plus today’s surviving capital stock,  ( ) t K k d - 1 . Finally a 
no-Ponzi game condition,  0 ) 1 /(   lim = + ¥ ﬁ
t
t t R b , should be imposed on the household so that, 




There are three factors of production in the economy: private capital, public 
infrastructure, and labor. The final good is produced according to the technology,  
 
( ) t t Gt t n k K f y , ,
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The production function  f  satisfies standard properties and exhibits constant returns to scale 
over private inputs so that factor payments exhaust revenues. The effective aggregate stock of 
public infrastructure, 
*
Gt K , is a publicly provided input in production.
2 This effective public 




Gt Gt K K q =                                                                                                                         (3) 
 
where 0#2 #1 is a measure of effectiveness. Oftentimes in developing countries the stock of 
public infrastructure is not in perfect condition, hence the service derived from using it is 
diminished. 
At each date, the firm chooses levels of  t t t n k y , ,  so as to maximize net-of-tax profit 
according to 
 
( ) t t t t t t n w k R y - - -l 1  ,                                                                                                    (4) 
 
where  t l  is the tax rate on output. Alternatively, it will be useful to interpret  t l  as the share 




The revenue obtained from taxing output is used by the government to invest in 
infrastructure  ) ( Gt I .
3 The government balances its budget constraint as follows, 
 
. t t Gt y I l =                                                                                                                          (5) 
 
Public capital evolves according to, 
 
( ) Gt G Gt Gt K I K d - + = + 1 1 ,                                                                                                    (6) 
 
where  G d  is the depreciation rate of public capital. Next period’s stock of infrastructure, 
) ( 1 + Gt K , is  equal to the amount invested this period,  ) ( Gt I , plus the surviving stock, 
). ) 1 (( Gt G K d -  
 
 
2. Public infrastructure is not privately provided because private agents are unwilling or unable to do so because it can 
be very hard to exclude free-riders or to charge users a competitive price. 
3. In this model, borrowing from abroad i s not used to finance infrastructure; only taxation can fund public 
investments. Even if agents where allowed to borrow, they would have to pay the loans by increased taxes sooner 
or later. In order to understand the full long run effects of infrastructure, the model should account that eventually 
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4. Market Clearing and Foreign Sector 
 
The goods market clearing condition is:  
 
, t t Gt t t y TB I i c = + + +                                                                                                      (7) 
where  t TB  is the trade balance at time t. As in standard international finance models, the trade 
balance is the difference between output  ) ( t y  and domestic absorption  ) ( Gt t t I i c + + . The net 
holdings of foreign bonds evolves as follows, 
 
. 1 t t t t TB b b p + = +                                                                                                                (8) 
 
This equation is basically the country’s balance of payments. In steady state, the trade balance 
simply becomes b p ) 1 ( - .
4 
 
III. Solution Procedure and Intuition 
 
In general, an analytic solution for this economy is not possible due to nonlinearities. 
The model must be solved numerically. First, the Euler equations of the system are obtained. 
They are described by, 
 
( ) ( )
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, 1 / 1 /
, ,
, 1 ,
1 , 1 ,
t t c t l
t t c t c












The subscripts c  and l  on U  denote the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure, 
respectively, at time t. The basic unit of analysis for the model’s solution is composed of these 
three Euler equations, the government budget constraint (Equation (5)), the household’s budget 
constraint (Equation (2)), and the transversality condition,  0 lim 1 = L + ¥ ﬁ t t
t
t k b , (where  t L  is 
the lagrangian multiplier used for Equation (2) in the maximization procedure). The Euler 
equations can be described intuitively. The first equation describes the relevant margins that 
the household must consider when deciding on investment. Hence, the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption today and consumption tomorrow ( t c t c U U , 1 , / + b ) must be 
equal at the margin to the net return on investment in terms of consumable output, 
)) 1 ( /( 1 1 K t R d - + + . The second Euler equation describes the decision on the level of net foreign 
 
4. The description of the international sector is similar to Rebelo and Vegh (1995) and Correia, Neves, and Rebelo 
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assets to be held. Basically, the marginal rate of substitution must equal the price of foreign 
bonds. The return on foreign bonds and capital has to be equal so that both assets are held. 
Hence, these two Euler equations can be combined yielding:  K t t p R d - - = + 1 ) / 1 ( 1 , where Rt+1 
is simply the world interest rate, which is exogenous from the small country’s point of view.
5 
Finally, the third Euler equation describes the working decision. The marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and leisure ( t c t l U U , , / ) must be equal at the margin to the 
real wage rate,  t w .  
How does infrastructure affect the Euler equations? Infrastructure has a crucial effect on 
the marginal products of private factors. Any additional public investment is financed in the 
model by raising taxes (i.e., raising,  l, the share of GDP that goes to infrastructure 
investment). The additional infrastructure has two effects on the net-of-tax rate of return, 
( ) ( ) n K k f R G K , , 1 l - = , and on the wage rate  ( ) ( ) n K k f w G N , , 1 l - = .
6 The first effect (arising 
from a direct resource cost) obviously decreases the wage rate because of the higher tax 
necessary to fund more infrastructure (i.e.,  ﬂ ›￿ w l ). Conversely, this resource cost cannot 
affect the net return, R, which is fixed at the world rate of interest. This implies that, ceteris 
paribus, inputs need to adjust to keep the marginal product of capital equal to R . On the other 
hand, the second effect (a resource benefit) works opposite to the first effect since the 
additional infrastructure enhances the productivity of the existing private factors (i.e., 
› ›￿ w KG ). This resource benefit also tends to raise the marginal product of capital, but 
cannot because it is fixed at  R . Nevertheless, the resource benefit should partially (other 
inputs may also adjust) offset the increase in l (the resource cost) keeping the net-of-tax 
marginal product of capital constant at R .
7 
Consequently, public investment has both a resource cost and a resource benefit. This is 
why it should not be obvious that infrastructure investment (paid for by taxation) always 
increases GDP or private investment. The next section describes which of these effects 
dominates and under what conditions. With time subscripts removed, the Euler equations and 
constraints above describe the steady state of the model. This steady state is computed 
numerically since the non-linearities complicate a closed-form solution. Once it is calculated, 
the macroeconomic effects of policy experiments involving additional (or less) infrastructure 
investment can be quantified. 
 




The model has to be solved, parameterized and simulated in order to evaluate its 
 
5.  Using the expression for the world interest rate, the steady state trade balance is  = - = b p TB ) 1 (  
b R R K K )] 1 /( ) [( d d - + - - . Given that  R  is the world interest rate and TB is a percentage of GDP, b can easily be 
determined. 
6. The subscripts  K  and  N denote the marginal products of capital and labor, respectively. 
7. Baxter and King (1993) discuss these two effects in a closed economy setting. RIOJA: GROWTH, WELFARE, AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
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quantitative implications. The specific functional forms for utility and technology are assumed 
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The benchmark values for the parameters used in this paper are presented in Table 1. 
Individual estimates for Brazil, Mexico, and Peru are used when available. For example, Elias 
(1992) estimates the capital share of income, which corresponds to the parameter ", in these 
three countries as: 45%, 69%, and 66% in Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, respectively. 
 
Table 1  Benchmark Parameters 
Parameter  Description  Brazil  Mexico  Peru 
a  Private capital coefficient  0.45  0.69  -0.66 
l  Infrastructure share (% of GDP)  6.3  7.6  -5.6 
a  Trade Balance (% of GDP)  0.42  0.64  -1.61 
 
Rebelo and Vegh (1995) report the average share of GDP that was spent on 
infrastructure investment in the 1970s and 1980s. Mexico had the highest share with 7.6% of 
GDP spent of infrastructure investment. Brazil and Peru spent 6.3% and 5.6% respectively. 
Data from the World Development Indicators (1998) is used to compute the average trade 
balance (as percent of GDP) over this same time period. Brazil and Peru ran trade balance 
surpluses of 0.42% and 0.64%, while Peru had a deficit of 1.61%.  
The rest of the parameters used are estimates for developing countries, since individual 
country estimates are not available. First, the coefficient of public capital in the production 
function, f , is set to 0.10 in the benchmark. This choice is an average of Hulten’s (1996), 
Canning and Fay’s (1993) and Easterly and Rebelo’s (1993) estimates, which are all in the low 
end of estimates. Next, the depreciation rate of private capital,  K d , is set to 10% per year or 
2.5% per quarter. This figure is in Elias’s (1992) estimated range for capital depreciation in 
Latin America. The depreciation rate of public capital, on the other hand, is estimated by the 
World Bank to be about twice that of private capital (World Development Report 1994). Hence, 
it is set to 5% per quarter in the benchmark.  
Preference parameters are set as follows. A value of 0.35 is used for the consumption 
share g. Such value implies a leisure share of 0.65, which is consistent in the model with the 
allocation of roughly one-third of a household’s time to market activities. Next, the curvature 
parameter, s , is set to 2.33, which comes from Ostry and Reinhart’s (1992) estimates for 
developing countries. The world interest rate is set to 1% per quarter following Rebelo and 
Vegh (1995) which implies an annual return of 4%. This parameter choice for the interest rate 
implies that the discount rate, b , equals 0.99. Finally, the 1994 World Development Report 
estimates that the average effectiveness of public infrastructure in Latin America is about 75%, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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The long-run effects of increasing infrastructure investment are presented in Table 2. 
The additional public investment is funded by taxation increases (i.e., by increasing the share 
of GDP devoted to infrastructure investment, l). Hence, l is alternatively raised by 1% of 
GDP, 5% of GDP, and 10% of GDP above the country’s individual benchmark. Then, the 
resulting effects on GDP ( y D ), private investment ( i D ), and welfare (measured by  w D ) are 
computed for each country.
8  
 
Table 2  Long-Run Effects of Raising Infrastructure Investment 
(percent change from benchmark) 
  l D   1.0  5.0  10.0 
Brazil  y D   2.23  7.82  10.4 
  i D   1.14  2.07  -1.37 
  w D   1.14  2.03  -1.45 
Mexico  y D   2.35  6.04  2.56 
  i D   1.25  0.32  -8.56 
  w D   1.23  0.31  -8.68 
Peru  y D   3.96  12.1  12.2 
  i D   2.86  6.18  0.30 
  w D   2.89  6.37  0.68 
 
Consider, for example, the results for Brazil. A 1%-of-GDP increase in public 
infrastructure investment increases output by 2.23%. At the same time, private investment and 
welfare rise by 1.14%. Hence, the resource benefit of higher infrastructure investment exceeds 
the resource cost. Among the three countries, the 1%-of-GDP public investment increase has 
its largest positive effects for Peru. Output in Peru rises by 3.96% and welfare by 2.89%. These 
effects are twice the size of the ones in Brazil and Mexico. Considering that Brazil and Mexico 
have been investing larger shares of GDP in infrastructure, the result is not surprising. Peru has 
only been investing an average of 5.6% of GDP in infrastructure, while Brazil and Mexico 
have invested 6.3% and 7.6% of GDP, respectively. Hence, the gains of a 1% raise are larger 
in Peru which is the more infrastructure-deprived country of the three. 
Overall, raising l by 1% above its benchmark has positive effects in all three countries. 
Table 2 also describes the effects of raising l by 5% and 10%. For example, in Brazil’s case, 
raising l by 10% has a positive effect on GDP of 10.4%, but private investment and welfare 
are both  negatively affected! The reason for this, however, follows from the intuition 
 
8. As in Lucas (1987), the measure of welfare change is an equivalent change in aggregate consumption. It is a number 
w so that consumers are indifferent between: (i) a raise in  l which provides more revenue to fund more 
infrastructure, and (ii) keeping lthe same but reducing consumption by w percent. RIOJA: GROWTH, WELFARE, AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
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explained in Section III. Recall that a raise in l has both a resource cost and a resource benefit. 
Increasing l by 10% means that while infrastructure investment is being raised by that 
amount, this must be funded by an increase in taxes (the resource cost). Hence the resource 
cost has exceeded the resource benefit at this point. Private investment and welfare are both 
adversely affected due to the large increase in taxation. These adverse effects of a 10% raise in 
l can be seen in Brazil and Mexico’s case. In Peru’s case, however, the effects of such 
increase do not quite become negative. However, they do become very small: private 
investment only rises by 0.30% and welfare by 0.68%. Given Peru’s low benchmark 
infrastructure expenditure, even with a 10% rise, the resource benefit is slightly larger than the 
resource cost. 
Summarizing Table 2, additional infrastructure investment can be beneficial, but too 
much may be detrimental. In order to give concrete policy recommendations, the analysis can 
be extended even further. A government official may ask, how much should infrastructure 
investment be increased in order to get the maximum welfare gains? Figures 1 through 3 
attempt to answer this question. These figures plot the change in welfare for different levels of 
infrastructure investment. Brazil’s case is depicted in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1  Welfare Effects of Infrastructure : Brazil 
 
The horizontal axis measures the share of GDP devoted to infrastructure investment ( l). 
Brazil’s benchmark is l= 6.3, which is marked by a vertical line as a point of reference. 
Clearly, reducing public infrastructure investment (moving to the left of the benchmark) has 
adverse effects on welfare (measured on the vertical axis). Conversely, raising l has at first 
a positive effect, which later diminishes and eventually becomes negative (as Table 2 
indicated). The peak of this curve is around l= 10. Therefore, the largest welfare gains can be 
obtained by devoting about 10% of GDP to public investment. 
A corresponding plot for Mexico is described in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2  Welfare Effects of Infrastructure : Mexico 
 
Note, however, that Mexico is much closer to optimal infrastructure investment than 
Brazil. Peru’s case, shown on Figure 3, is much more striking since it starts from the lowest 
benchmark l= 5.6. Peru’s plot shows the largest potential gains of optimal infrastructure 
policy, with a potential welfare increase of about 6% above benchmark. 
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Figure 3  Welfare Effects of Infrastructure : Peru 
 
Another interesting feature of the plots is that the optimal share of infrastructure 
investment is around 10% of GDP for all three countries. One of the most important 
determinants of this optimal share is the coefficient of public infrastructure in the production RIOJA: GROWTH, WELFARE, AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
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function, N  (as shown in Barro’s (1990) simpler model). This coefficient was parameterized to 
0.10 using an average of fairly conservative estimates cited in Section IV, A. Good individual 
estimates for this parameter are unfortunately not available for these three countries, so a 
conservative average was used for all three. This yields an approximately equal optimal share 
of public infrastructure for all three countries. However, even using this a low, conservative 
estimate from the literature shows that these countries have all under-invested in infrastructure. 





This paper quantifies the effects of infrastructure investment on GDP, private 
investment, and welfare using a calibrated general equilibrium model of a small open economy. 
The model is parameterized to data from Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, but could potentially be 
applied to other countries. For these three countries, results indicate that, devoting additional 
resources to infrastructure investment pays-off in terms of net increases in GDP. In addition, 
there exist sizable positive effects on private business investment. More highways and public 
communication networks encourage private companies to invest because using these public 
inputs can increase productivity of private factors. 
This paper also contributes to the literature by studying the welfare effects of 
infrastructure policy, which can be very important in guiding policymakers’ decisions. Results 
show that there is a range over which infrastructure investment in the three countries is welfare 
improving. However, very high levels of infrastructure investment can adversely affect 
welfare due to increased taxation necessary to fund it. In any e vent, all three countries 
under-invested in infrastructure in the 1970s and 1980s, so there is room for increased 
infrastructure investment that would be beneficial. 
Potential extensions to this work would study the neglect of maintenance and repair of 
infrastructure networks in developing countries. Policymakers have often emphasized 
building brand new infrastructure over maintaining existing networks in optimal shape. The 
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